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Shocks and Relationships 
 
1. Introduction 
Brown et al. (2004) find that in stationary conditions of an experimental labor 
market with the possibility of repeated interactions between firms and workers long-
term relationships emerge endogenously even without third party enforcement of the 
contracts. The majority of trades are initiated by firms making private offers to 
individual workers who in turn exert high levels of effort throughout all the periods. 
The competition resulting from excess labor supply seems to have little impact on 
wages which remain substantially higher than the market clearing level. 
However, in practice many (if not all) firms operate in variable or uncertain 
market conditions. Firms’ profitability can be affected by changes in demand for their 
products, technology they use, input costs or by changes in other variables; warranting 
an extension of existing experimental designs to include non-stationarity as a 
boundary condition. In this paper we study the effects of revenue fluctuations on long-
term relationships between firms and workers.  
But why would revenue shocks influence firm-worker interactions (other than 
through standard economic variables)? A wide body of psychology literature points 
out that external stimuli impinge on relationships (e.g., Cialdini (2007), Menon and 
Sheldon (2008)). We suspect that this could be the case with economic relationships 
as well especially in scenarios when fairness is a salient consideration (e.g., Güth et 
al. (1982), Kahneman et al. (1986)). The central premise of our paper is that the 
revenue shocks disrupt long-term relationships between two transacting parties 
despite the fact that staying in a relationship might dominate the outside option.  
In a related study Fehr et al. (1996) provide experimental evidence that firms 
with better profit opportunities pay systematically higher wages and higher job rents.1 
This result points out a channel (i.e., wages and effort) through which the shocks 
could disrupt relationships. However, because there is no reputation building in Fehr 
et al. experiment, their design does not permit a conclusion as to whether fluctuations 
in firm’s profitability affect long-term relationship between a firm and a worker.  
                                                 
1 Fehr et al. vary the firms’ revenue coefficients to make them more or less productive. 
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We explore this question in an experiment designed to give subjects an 
opportunity to form and sustain relationships in non-stationary conditions. While we 
find that revenue shocks had no significant effect on wages and little effect on 
relationships, we observe some impact of shocks on market efficiency: the workers 
exert lower effort and the realized potential surplus is lower when revenue shocks 
exist. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
    We modify the experimental design of Brown et al. (2004) by introducing 
exogenous revenue shocks to a firm’s payoff: 
*
0f
A e w if a contract is concluded
if no contract is concluded
π −⎧= ⎨⎩ , 
where A is the revenue coefficient, w ∈ {1, 2, …, 100} is the wage paid to a 
worker, and e ∈ {1, 2, …, 10} is the effort exerted by the contracted worker. Worker 
receives a payoff: 
⎩⎨
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concludediscontractaifecw
w 5
)(π
, 
    where c(e) is the cost of exerting effort. The cost schedule is presented in table 
1. 
 
Table 1. Cost of effort schedule 
 
Seven firms and ten workers participate in each experimental labor market. Each 
participant’s role and ID are fixed throughout the experiment. There are 15 trading 
periods, each lasting 3 minutes. A firm can employ at most one worker and each 
worker can accept a maximum of one job offer per period. 
A trading period has two stages. In the first stage, firms make contract offers to 
workers. A worker can either accept one of the offers or deny them, in which case he 
earns 5 experimental dollars. An offer includes a wage, a desired effort level, and the 
firm's ID. During the trading period a firm can make private offers that only reach a 
specified worker and public offers that reach all available workers. As soon as a 
worker accepts one of the firm’s offers, all the firm’s other standing offers 
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immediately disappear from the market. If a firm and a worker conclude a contract, 
they enter the second stage. In the second stage, the worker chooses an effort level 
after which the period payoffs are determined. 
We implement two experimental conditions, Shocks and No Shocks, in an across-
subjects design. In Shocks condition, A is either equal to 10 or 7, with a 50/50 
probability. This information is common knowledge. Each firm observes its own 
coefficient A but not coefficients of other firms. The firm's coefficient A is revealed to 
the worker who had a contract with the firm after the worker had submitted the effort 
level. Otherwise a worker does not observe any firm's coefficient A. In No Shocks 
condition, the coefficient A is always fixed at 7 for all firms. 
Under the rationality and selfishness assumptions, workers will choose the 
minimum effort, e = 1, regardless of the wage offered. The prevailing wage in the 
market is close to the workers’ reservation wage and such outcome is obviously not 
efficient. According to the cost schedule c(e) in table 1, the marginal cost of effort is 
at most 3. Because A is either equal to 10 or 7, the efficient level of effort is e = 10.  
In Brown et al. (2004) both wages and effort levels are above the market clearing 
level and are even higher if the interaction is repeated, providing evidence that 
relationships can be an important economic variable. Within this framework we 
compare Shocks condition and No Shocks condition in three dimensions: the stability 
of relationships as measured by their duration, the wages offered by firms, and the 
effort provided by workers.  
 
3. Procedures and Analysis 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher (2007)). We ran four Shocks sessions and three No Shocks sessions in 
the Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona and three Shocks and three 
No Shocks sessions at SHUFE Economics Lab in Shanghai in spring semester 2006.2 
The recruited subjects were undergraduate students from the respective universities.3 
The average payoff in the sessions conducted was 25 USD in Arizona and 30 Yuan in 
                                                 
2 The primary reason for running the experiment at two different locations was exceeding the 
dissertation budget at the University of Arizona. We found no significant difference in behavior 
between Arizona and Shanghai students. 
3 There were 2 sessions in Arizona where less then 17 subjects showed up and several graduate 
students from Economics, Finance, and Accounting were asked to serve as subjects to fill in the empty 
spots. 
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Shanghai.4 The average on-campus wage of a University of Arizona student was 
around 7 USD per hour and in Shanghai around 12 Yuan per hour at the time of the 
experiment. 
 
The Length of Relationships 
 In No Shocks we observed 622 transactions in 6 sessions with a total of 306 
relationships. In Shocks we observed 713 transactions in 7 sessions with a total of 399 
relationships. The average relationship length in No Shocks was 2.03 periods while in 
Shocks it was 1.77 periods. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the length of 
relationships in Shocks is the same as in No Shocks at the 5% significance level 
(Means test p = 0.081 and Mann-Whitney test p = 0.346). This finding is supported by 
another observation that the relationships do not break up significantly more often 
following a wage decrease in Shocks than in No Shocks (2-sided Fisher exact test p = 
0.464). 
 
Wages 
Figure 1 shows that in Shocks the average wage given the high revenue (A=10) is 
higher for most periods than the average wage given the low revenue (A=7). We apply 
the Mann-Whitney test to session averages as individual observations to test the 
hypothesis that the firms in high revenue periods offer wages at the same level as the 
firms in low revenue periods. The null is rejected at the 1% significance level (p = 
0.003). In line with Fehr et al. (1996), this result indicates that firms offer higher 
wages in periods with high revenues. 
The firms in Shocks have on average higher marginal revenue than in No Shocks. 
Based on the previous result, the firms in Shocks should on average offer higher 
wages than in No Shocks. The question is whether firms offer higher wages also in 
the low revenue periods in Shocks than in No Shocks. If the wages in Shocks do not 
fluctuate and are above the wage level in No Shocks, then the data would provide 
support for wage rigidity as observed by Brown et al. (2004). If such wage rigidity 
exists, it is caused by the employer’s concern for long-term relationship. 
The average wage across all periods in No Shocks (26.94) is almost the same as 
the average wage in low revenue periods in Shocks (26.37). The Mann-Whitney test 
with session averages as individual observations supports this observation and does 
                                                 
4 The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was 1 USD = 8 Yuan. 
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not reject the hypothesis that the wages in the two samples are equal (p = 0.350). Our 
data thus provide evidence that Brown et al. (2004) wage rigidity result is robust to 
the boundary conditions with exogenous revenue shocks. 
0. 00
5. 00
10. 00
15. 00
20. 00
25. 00
30. 00
35. 00
40. 00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Per i od
Wag
e A=7,  Shocks condi t i on
A=10,  Shocks condi t i on
No Shocks condi t i on
 
Figure 1. Average wage 
 
Effort 
 The average effort level for a given period in No Shocks is significantly higher 
than in Shocks (Means p = 0.000 and Mann-Whitney p = 0.000). 5 In figure 2 we also 
observe a last-period effect as the average effort level in period 15 is much lower than 
in all previous periods. Because the effort level is an indicator of market efficiency 
(i.e., the total surplus) in our setting, the market outcome in No Shocks is also more 
efficient than in Shocks despite its lower average revenue coefficient.  
                                                 
5 However, the Mann-Whitney test with session averages as individual observations is not significant 
(p = 0.361). 
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Figure 2. Average effort 
 
In order to better assess the difference in effort levels between No Shocks and 
Shocks conditions Table 2 reports their comparison given the control for received 
wages.6 The regression results show that given the same wage, the effort level in 
Shocks is on average lower by 1.02 than in No Shocks.  
 
Effort Coefficient St. Error t P>|t| 
Constant 1.46 0.128 11.40 .000 
Shock -1.02 0.113 -8.97 .000 
Wage 0.16 0.003 45.93 .000 
Table 2. A comparison of effort levels between Shocks and No Shocks (n = 1335) 
 
4. Discussion 
We report results of a laboratory experiment studying the impact of exogenous 
shocks to firms’ revenues on long-term relationship between firms and workers as 
well as the corresponding market performance. While we find that shocks had no 
significant effect on wages and little effect on relationships, we observe clear 
evidence in effort levels: given the same wage, the workers exert significantly lower 
effort in Shocks comparing to No Shocks. Hence, the presence of shocks in our 
experiment decreases market efficiency. 
                                                 
6 In the regression, Shock is a dummy variable (1 for Shocks and 0 for No Shocks). 
 8
The current experiment does not permit a conclusion as to what were the 
reasons for the workers to exert lower levels of efforts when uncertain market 
conditions were present nor whether this problem would be alleviated if the 
realization of coefficient A was known to both the firm and the worker. Gächter and 
Riedl (2005) study suggests that the entitlement effect could have been responsible for 
the observed behavior. However, a different design, specifically aimed to address this 
issue is needed. 
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Appendix 
Instructions (Shocks) 
 
 
Buyer #................ 
Instructions for Buyers 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. Everything that you need to know in order to participate in this 
experiment is explained below. Should you have any difficulties in understanding 
these instructions please notify us. We will answer your questions at your cubicle. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial endowment of 5 US 
Dollars. During the course of the experiment you can earn a further amount of money 
by gaining points. The amount of points that you gain during the experiment depends 
on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. 
 
All points that you gain during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into 
US Dollars at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
1 point = 0.1 US Dollars 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the money that you earned during 
the experiment in addition to your endowment of 5 US Dollars. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions, 
which you will enter on a computer screen. There are 15 periods in all. 
 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the 
experiment. In addition we would like to point out that you may only use the 
computer functions which are required for the experiment. Communication between 
participants and unnecessary interference with computers will lead to the exclusion 
from the experiment. In case you have any questions don't hesitate to ask us. 
 
Prior to the experiment the 17 participants were divided into 2 groups: buyers and 
sellers. In this experiment there are 10 sellers and 7 buyers. 
 
You are a buyer throughout the whole experiment. All participants have received 
an identification number which they will keep for the entire experiment. Your 
identification number is stated on the documentation sheet in front of you. 
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An Overview of the Experimental Procedures 
 
In each period of the experiment every buyer can buy a product from a seller. The 
seller earns a profit by trading if he sells the product at a price, which exceeds his 
production costs. The buyer earns a profit by trading if the price he pays for the 
product is less than what the product is worth to him. The production costs and the 
product's value for the buyer depend on the quality of the product. 
 
The experiment lasts for 15 periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
 
1. Each period starts with a trading phase which lasts for 3 minutes. During this 
phase buyers can submit offers, which can be accepted by sellers. When 
submitting an offer a buyer has to specify three things: 
 
• which price he offers to pay, 
• which product quality he desires, 
• and finally, which seller he wants to submit the offer to. Buyers can submit 
two types of offers; private offers and public offers. Private offers are 
submitted to one seller only and can only be accepted by that seller. Public 
offers are submitted to all sellers and can be accepted by any seller. 
 
As a buyer you can - in each period - submit as many offers as you like. Submitted 
offers can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. Each buyer and each 
seller can at most conclude one trade in each period. As there are 10 sellers and 
7 buyers, several sellers will not trade in each period. 
 
2. Following the trading phase each seller who has concluded a trade determines 
which product quality he will supply. The seller is not obliged to supply the 
product quality desired by his buyer. Once every seller has chosen a product 
quality each participant's earnings in the current period are determined. After this 
the next period starts. 
 
The points gained from all 15 periods will be summed up at the end of the 
experiment, exchanged into US Dollars and paid together with your endowment in 
cash. 
 
The Experimental Procedures in Detail 
 
There are 7 buyers and 10 sellers in the experiment. You are a buyer throughout the 
whole experiment. During the experiment you will enter your decisions on a computer 
screen. In the following we describe in detail how you can make your decisions in 
each period. 
 
1.  The Trading Phase 
 
Each period starts with a trading phase. During the trading phase each buyer can 
conclude a trade with a seller. In order to do so each buyer can submit as many 
offers as he wishes. In each trading phase you will see the following screen: 
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• In the top left corner of the screen you see in which period of the experiment you 
are. In the top right corner of the screen you will see the time remaining in this 
trading phase, displayed in seconds. The trading phase in each period lasts 3 
minutes (=180 seconds). When this time is up the trading phase is over. 
Hereafter, no further offers can be submitted or accepted in this period. 
 
• On the right hand side of the screen you can see your ID number and your 
“coefficient A.” The detailed description of the coefficient A and how A is related 
to your income will be discussed in the section “how are the incomes calculated.” 
 
• Once the above screen is displayed the trading phase starts. As a buyer you now 
have the opportunity to submit offers to the sellers. In order to do so you have to 
enter three things on the right hand side of the screen: 
 
a) First you have to specify whether you want to submit a public or a private offer: 
 
• Public trade offers 
Public offers will be communicated to all participants in the market. All sellers 
see all public offers on their screens. A public offer can therefore be accepted 
by any seller. As a buyer you will also see all public offers submitted by all 
buyers.  
If you want to submit a public offer, click on the field "public", using the 
mouse. 
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• Private trade offers 
A private offer is submitted to one seller only. Only this seller is informed 
about the offer and only this seller can accept the offer. No other seller or 
buyer will be informed about that offer. 
If you want to submit a private offer, click on the field “private” using the 
mouse. After that you specify which seller you want to submit the offer to in 
the field below. Each of the 10 sellers has an identification number (seller 1, 
seller 2, ....., seller 10). Each seller keeps his identification number throughout 
the whole experiment. To submit an offer to a specific seller you enter the 
number of that seller (e.g., "4" for seller 4). 
 
b) Once you have specified to whom you want to submit an offer, you must 
determine which price you offer. You enter this in the field "Your price". The 
price you offer is a number between 0 and 100: 
 
0 ≤ price offered ≤ 100 
 
c) Finally you have to specify which product quality you desire. You enter this in 
the field "Desired quality". Your desired quality is a number between 1 and 10: 
 
1 ≤ desired quality ≤ 10 
 
After you have completely specified your offer, you must click on the "OK" 
button to submit it. As long as you have not clicked "OK" you can change your 
offer. After you click "OK" the offer will be displayed to all sellers you have 
submitted it to. 
 
• On the left side of your screen you see the header "public offers". All public offers 
in the current trading phase are displayed here. Your public offers as well as those 
of all other buyers will be displayed. You can see which buyer submitted the offer, 
which price he offered and which quality he desired. All buyers also have an 
identification number, which they keep throughout the whole experiment. 
 
• In the middle of your screen under the header "Your private offers". You see all 
private offers, which you have submitted in the current trading phase. You see 
which price you offered, which quality you desired and which seller you 
submitted an offer to. 
 
• Each buyer can submit as many private and public offers as he wishes in 
each period. Each offer that you submit can be accepted at any time during the 
trading phase. 
 
• In any given period each buyer can conclude at most one trade. Once one of 
your offers has been accepted you will be notified which seller accepted which of 
your offers. In the bottom right corner of your screen the identification number of 
the seller will be displayed as well as your offered price and your desired quality. 
As you can conclude only one trade in each period all your other offers will be 
automatically cancelled. Also, you will not be able to submit any further offers. 
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• In any given period each seller can conclude at most one trade. You will be 
continuously informed which sellers have not yet accepted an offer. On the right 
bottom of the screen you see 10 fields, each field for one of the ten sellers. Once a 
seller has accepted an offer a “x” will appear in the field next to the seller’s 
identification number. You cannot submit private offers to a seller who has 
already concluded a trade. 
 
• Once all 7 buyers have concluded a trade or after 3 minutes have elapsed, the 
trading phase is over. 
 
• No buyer is obliged to submit offers, and no seller is obliged to accept an offer. 
 
2.  Determination of the Product Quality 
 
• Following the trading phase, all sellers who have concluded a trade determine 
which product quality they supply to their respective buyers. The product 
quality, which you desired in your offer, is not binding for your seller. Your 
seller can choose the exact quality you desired, but he can also choose a higher or 
a lower product quality. The product quality which your seller chooses has to be 
between 1 and 10: 
 
1 ≤ product quality ≤ 10 
 
• While your seller determines the actual product quality, we ask you to specify 
which quality you expect him to supply on a separate screen. In addition we ask 
you to state how sure you are about this expectation. 
 
How are the Incomes Calculated? 
 
Your income: 
 
• If you do not conclude a trade during a trading phase you receive an income of 0 
points in that period. 
 
• If one of your offers is accepted, your income depends on the price you offered 
and on the product quality. Your income is determined as follows: 
 
Your income = A * product quality – price 
 
In each period, with probability of 0.5 your coefficient A in the above equation is 
equal to 10, and A is equal to 7 with the same probability. The coefficient A is 
independent of the periods and A is also independent of the buyers. Your 
coefficient A is shown to you in the “trading phase screen” at the beginning of 
the period. 
• As you can see from the above formula your income is higher, the higher the 
product quality actually supplied by your seller. At the same time your income is 
higher, the lower the price you paid for the product. 
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Income of your seller: 
 
• If a seller has not concluded a trade during a trading phase he gains an income of 
5 points in that period. 
 
• If a seller has accepted an offer his income equals the price he receives minus the 
production costs he incurs. The income of the seller is determined as follows: 
 
Income of your seller = Price - production costs 
 
• The production costs of a seller are higher, the higher the quality he chooses. The 
production costs for each product quality are displayed in the table below: 
 
Product quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Production costs 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
 
• The income of your seller is higher, the higher the price. Further, his income is 
higher, the lower the product quality he supplies. 
 
The income of all buyers and sellers are determined in the way as described above. 
Each buyer can therefore calculate the income of his seller and each seller can 
calculate the income of his buyer. Further, each buyer and seller is informed about 
the identification number of his trading partner in each period. 
 
Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses have 
to be paid from your initial endowment or from earnings made in other periods. 
 
You will be informed about your income and the income of your seller on an "income 
screen". On the screen (see below) the following will be displayed: 
• which seller you traded with 
• which price you offered 
• your desired quality 
• the product quality actually chosen by your seller 
• the income of your seller in this period 
• your income in this period. 
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Please enter all the information in the documentation sheet supplied to you. After the 
income screen has been displayed, the period is over. Thereafter the trading phase of 
the following period starts. Once you have finished studying the income screen please 
click on the "continue" button. 
 
The sellers also see an income screen, which displays the above information. They see 
the ID of their trading partner, the price, desired and actually supplied product quality 
as well as both incomes. 
 
The experiment will not start until all participants are completely familiar with all 
procedures. In order to secure that this is the case we kindly ask you to solve the 
exercises below. 
 
In addition we will conduct 2 trials of the trading phase, so that you can get 
accustomed to the computer. During the trial phases no money can be earned. After 
the trial phases we will begin the experiment, which will last for 15 periods. 
 
 16
Control Questionnaire 
 
Please solve the following exercises completely. If you have questions ask the 
experimenter. 
 
Exercise 1 
You did not make an offer during a trading phase. What is your income in this period? 
Your income = 
 
Exercise 2 
Your coefficient A is equal to 10. You offered a price of 30 and indicated a desired 
quality of 9. A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a quality of 8. 
Your income = 
Income of your seller = 
 
Exercise 3 
Your coefficient A is equal to 7. You offered a price of 60 and indicated a desired 
quality of 9. A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a quality of 6. 
Your income = 
Income of your seller = 
 
Exercise 4 
Your coefficient A is equal to 7. You offered a price of 10 and indicated a desired 
quality of 2. A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a quality of 5. 
Your income = 
Income of your seller = 
 
Exercise 5 
Your coefficient A is equal to 10. You offered a price of 10 and indicated a desired 
quality of 6. A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a quality of 2. 
Your income = 
Income of your seller = 
 
Exercise 6 
A seller did not accept an offer during a trading phase. What is the income of this 
seller in this period? 
Income of your seller = 
 
Exercise 7 
You made several offers during a trading phase. None of your offers has been 
accepted by a seller. What is your income in this period? 
Your income = 
 
If you have finished the exercises we recommend looking again at the exercises and 
the solutions provided. After this, please think about the decisions you want to make 
during the experiment. 
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Documentation sheet: Buyer 
 
This documentation sheet is meant for your orientation. Please complete the 
respective row in each period. 
 
 
Period ID of 
Your 
Seller 
Price Desired 
Quality 
Actual 
Quality 
Income of 
Your Seller 
Your 
Income 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13       
14       
15       
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         Seller #................ 
Instructions for Sellers 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. Everything that you need to know in order to participate in this 
experiment is explained below. Should you have any difficulties in understanding 
these instructions please notify us. We will answer your questions at your cubicle. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial endowment of 5 US 
Dollars. During the course of the experiment you can earn a further amount of money 
by gaining points. The amount of points that you gain during the experiment depends 
on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. 
 
All points that you gain during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into 
US Dollars at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
1 point = 0.1 US Dollars 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the money that you earned during 
the experiment in addition to your endowment of 5 US Dollars. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions 
which you will enter in a computer. In total there are 15 periods. 
 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the 
experiment. In addition we would like to point out that you may only use the 
computer functions which are required for the experiment. Communication between 
participants and unnecessary interference with computers will lead to the exclusion 
from the experiment. In case you have any questions don't hesitate to ask us. 
 
Prior to the experiment the 17 participants were divided into 2 groups: buyers and 
sellers. In this experiment there are 10 sellers and 7 buyers. 
 
You are a seller throughout the whole experiment. All participants have received 
an identification number which they will keep for the entire experiment. Your 
identification number is stated on the documentation sheet in front of you. 
 
An Overview of the Experimental Procedures 
 
In each period of the experiment every buyer can buy a product from a seller. The 
seller earns a profit by trading if he sells the product at a price which exceeds his 
production costs. The buyer earns a profit by trading if the price he pays for the 
product is less than what the product is worth to him. The production costs and the 
product's value for the buyer depend on the quality of the product. 
 
The experiment lasts 15 for periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
 
1. Each period starts with a trading phase, which lasts for 3 minutes. During this 
phase buyers can submit trade offers which can be accepted by sellers. When 
submitting an offer a buyer has to specify three things: 
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• which price he offers to pay, 
• which product quality he desires, 
• and finally, which seller he wants to submit the offer to. Buyers can submit 
two types of offers; private offers and public offers. Private offers are 
submitted to one seller only and can only be accepted by that seller. Public 
offers are submitted to all sellers and can be accepted by any seller. 
 
Buyers can - in each period - submit as many offers as they like. Submitted offers 
can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. Each buyer and each seller 
can only conclude one trade in each period. As there are 10 sellers and 7 
buyers, several sellers will not trade in each period. 
 
2. Following the trading phase each seller who has concluded a trade determines 
which product quality he will supply. The seller is not obliged to supply the 
product quality desired by his buyer. Once every seller has chosen a product 
quality each participant's earnings in the current period are determined. After this 
the next period starts. 
 
The points gained from all 15 periods will be summed up at the end of the 
experiment, exchanged into US Dollars and paid together with your endowment in 
cash. 
 
The Experimental Procedures in Detail 
 
There are 7 buyers and 10 sellers in the experiment. You are a seller throughout the 
whole experiment. During the experiment you will enter your decisions on a computer 
screen. In the following we describe in detail how you can make your decisions in 
each period. 
 
1. The Trading Phase 
 
Each period starts with a trading phase. During the trading phase each buyer can 
conclude a trade with a seller. In order to do this the buyers can submit offers to the 
sellers. As a seller you can - in each period - accept one of the offers. During the 
trading phase you will see the following screen: 
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• In the top left corner of the screen you see in which period of the experiment you 
are. In the top right corner of the screen you see the remaining time in the current 
trading phase, displayed in seconds. The trading phase in each period lasts 3 
minutes (=180 seconds). When this time is up the trading phase is over. 
Hereafter, no further offers can be submitted or accepted for this period. 
 
• Once the above screen is displayed the trading phase starts. As a seller you can 
now accept offers submitted by the buyers. There are two types of offers which 
you can accept: 
 
• Private offers to you 
Each buyer has the opportunity to submit private offers to you. You alone will 
be informed about these offers and you alone can accept them. No other 
seller or buyer is informed about these offers. If you receive private offers, 
they will appear on the left side of your screen, below the header "Private 
offers to you". The offer of a buyer contains the following information: the 
identification number of the buyer who submitted the offer, the price which he 
offers for the product and which product quality he desires. If you want to 
accept a private offer, you click first on the respective row in which the offer 
is displayed. When you do this, the offer will be highlighted. If you are sure 
you want to accept the offer you then click on the button "accept" which you 
find at the bottom of the screen. As long as you do not click "accept" you can 
alter your choice. 
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• Public offers 
Each buyer also has the possibility to submit public offers. All sellers are 
informed about these offers and any seller can accept them. If a buyer 
submits a public offer it appears on the right side of your screen, below the 
header "Public offers". The offer of a buyer again contains the identification 
number of the buyer who submitted the offer, the price which he offers for the 
product and which product quality he desires. This information is also 
displayed to all other sellers and all buyers. If you want to accept a public 
offer you follow the same procedures as with private offers. You click first on 
the respective row in which the offer is displayed. When you are sure that you 
want to accept the offer you click on the button "accept" which you find at the 
bottom right corner of the screen. As long as you do not click "accept" you can 
alter your choice. 
 
• As soon as you have pressed the “accept” button you will see which offer you 
have accepted in the bottom row of your screen. 
 
• Each seller can conclude at most one trade in each period. Once you have 
accepted one offer you cannot accept any further offers. 
 
All buyers have to observe the following rules when submitting trade offers: 
 
• The price offered by the buyer must be between 0 and 100: 
 
0 ≤ price ≤ 100 
 
• The desired quality of the buyer must be between 1 and 10: 
 
1 ≤ desired quality ≤ 10 
 
• Each buyer can - in each period - submit as many private and public offers as 
he wishes. Each offer submitted by a buyer can be accepted at any time during the 
trading phase. 
 
• Each buyer can conclude at most one trade in each period. Once an offer of a 
buyer has been accepted he will be informed about which seller accepted the offer. 
As each buyer can conclude only one trade in each period all other offers of the 
buyer will automatically be cancelled. Also, he cannot submit any further offers. 
 
• Once all 7 buyers have concluded a trade or after 3 minutes have elapsed, the 
trading phase is over. 
• No buyer is obliged to submit offers, and no seller is obliged to accept an offer. 
 
 
2. Determination of the Actual Product Quality 
 
• Following the trading phase, all sellers who have concluded a trade determine 
which product quality they supply to their buyers. The product quality desired 
by your buyer is not binding for you as a seller. You can exactly choose the 
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quality desired by your buyer, but also a higher or lower product quality. If you 
have concluded a trade during a trading phase, the following screen will appear. 
Here, you have to enter the product quality: 
 
 
 
In order to choose the actual product quality, you enter the value for the quality in the 
field "Choose the actual quality" and press the "OK" button to confirm your choice. 
As long as you have not pressed "OK" you can alter your choice. 
 
• The product quality you choose must be an integer between 1 and 10: 
 
1 ≤ product quality ≤ 10 
 
 
 
How are the Incomes calculated? 
 
Your income: 
 
• If you have not concluded a trade during a trading phase you receive an income 
of 5 points in that period. 
 
• If you have accepted an offer your income depends on the price you accepted and 
the product quality you choose to deliver. Your income is calculated as follows: 
 
Your income = Price - production costs 
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• Your production costs are higher, the higher the quality of the product you chose 
to deliver. The production costs for each product quality are displayed in the table 
below: 
 
Product quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Production costs 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
• Your income is therefore higher, the lower the product quality. Further, your 
income is higher, the higher the price. 
 
The income of your buyer: 
 
• If a buyer does not conclude a trade during a trading phase he receives an income 
of 0 points in that period. 
 
• If one of his offers is accepted, his income depends on the price he offered and the 
product quality. The income of your buyer will be determined as follows: 
 
Income of your buyer = A * product quality – price 
 
In each period, with probability of 0.5 your buyer’s coefficient A in the above 
equation is equal to 10, and A is equal to 7 with the same probability. Your 
buyer’s coefficient A is independent of the periods and A is also independent of 
the other buyers. Your buyer’s coefficient A is shown to you in the “income 
screen” at the end of the period. 
 
• As you can see from the above formula the income of your buyer is higher, the 
higher the product quality actually supplied by you. At the same time his income 
is higher, the lower the price he paid for the product. 
 
The income of all buyers and sellers are determined in the way as described above. 
Each buyer can therefore calculate the income of his seller and each seller can 
calculate the income of his buyer. Further, each buyer and each seller is informed 
about the identification number of his trading partner in each period. 
 
Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses have 
to be paid from the initial endowment or from earnings made in other periods. 
 
You will be informed about your income and the income of your buyer on an "income 
screen". On the screen (see below) the following will be displayed: 
• Which buyer you traded with 
• Your buyer’s coefficient A 
• Which price he offered 
• The desired quality of your buyer 
• The product quality actually chosen by you 
• The income of your buyer in this period 
• Your income in this period. 
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Please enter all the information in the documentation sheet supplied to you. After the 
income screen has been displayed, the period is over. Thereafter the trading phase of 
the following period starts. Once you have finished studying the income screen please 
click on the "continue" button. 
 
The buyers also see an income screen, which displays the above information. They 
see the ID of their trading partner, the price, the desired and the supplied product 
quality as well as both incomes. 
The experiment will not start until all participants are completely familiar with all 
procedures. In order to secure that this is the case we kindly ask you to solve the 
exercises below. 
 
In addition we will conduct 2 trials of the trading phase, so that you can get 
accustomed to the computer. During the trial phases no money can be earned. After 
the trial phases we will begin the experiment, which will last for 15 periods. 
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Control Questionnaire 
 
Please solve the following exercises completely. If you have questions ask the 
experimenter. 
 
Exercise 1 
You did not accept an offer during a trading phase. What is your income in this 
period? 
Your income = 
 
Exercise 2 
You accepted an offer with a price of 30 and a desired quality of 9. You supplied an 
actual quality of 8. 
Your income = 
Income of your buyer = 
 
Exercise 3 
You accepted an offer with a price of 60 and a desired quality of 9. You supplied an 
actual quality of 4. 
Your income = 
Income of your buyer = 
 
Exercise 4 
You accepted an offer with a price of 40 and a desired quality of 2. You supplied an 
actual quality of 5. 
Your income = 
Income of your buyer = 
 
Exercise 5 
You accepted an offer with a price of 30 and a desired quality of 6. You supplied an 
actual quality of 6. 
Your income = 
Income of your buyer = 
 
Exercise 6 
A buyer has made several offers during a trading phase. None of these offers has been 
accepted by a seller. What is the income of the buyer in this period? 
Income of buyer = 
 
If you have finished the exercises we recommend looking again at the exercises and 
the solutions provided. After this, please think about the decisions you want to make 
during the experiment. 
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Documentation sheet: Seller 
 
This documentation sheet is meant for your orientation. Please complete the 
respective row in each period. 
 
 
Period ID of 
Your 
Buyer 
Price Desired 
Quality 
Actual 
Quality 
Income of 
Your 
Buyer 
Your 
Income 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13       
14       
15       
 
 
 
 
